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Abstract: Shleifer and Vishny (1997) pointed out some of the practical and theoretical problems 
associated with assuming that rational risk-arbitrage would quickly drive asset prices back to 
long-run equilibrium.  In particular, they showed that the possibility that asset price 
disequilibrium would worsen, before being corrected, tends to limit rational speculators.   
Uniquely, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) showed that “performance-based asset management” 
would tend to reduce risk-arbitrage when it is needed most, when asset prices are furthest from 
equilibrium. We analyze a generalized Shleifer and Vishny (1997) model for central bank 
intervention.  We show that increasing availability of arbitrage capital has a pronounced effect 
on the dynamic intervention strategy of the central bank. Intervention is reduced during periods 
of moderate misalignment and amplified at times of extreme misalignment. This pattern is 
consistent with empirical observation. 
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Bank of St. Louis or the Federal Reserve System. The behavior of foreign exchange rates has puzzled economists since the breakdown of 
Bretton Woods in 1973.  First, exchange rates do not covary with interest rate differentials in any 
explicable way in the short- and medium-term (Hodrick (1987), Engel (1996) and Meredith and 
Chinn (1998)).  Second, a large literature has documented successful trend-following technical 
trading rules in foreign exchange markets (e.g., Sweeney (1986), Neely, Weller and Dittmar 
(1997)).  Third, foreign exchange rates are only weakly connected to fundamentals over long 
horizons.  (Meese and Rogoff (1983), Kilian (1999), Engel (2000), Mark and Sul (2001) and 
Rapach and Wohar (2002), Neely and Sarno (2002).  One might interpret the evidence to 
indicate that exchange rates are connected to fundamentals in the long-run and/or under extreme 
conditions, but that exchange rates can deviate substantially from their fundamental values for 
significant periods.  This misalignment of exchange rates presents a puzzle:  Why is there 
apparently insufficient risk-arbitrage to keep foreign exchange rates in line with fundamentals?  
Some researchers have sought to create general equilibrium models in which exchange 
rates seem to be disconnected from fundamentals, e.g. Duarte and Stockman (2002).  Such 
models are not yet wholly convincing; they cannot explain the behavior of risk premia or 
variation in exchange rates.  Models containing features such as noise trading and/or limits to 
arbitrage are also widely used (e.g., Devereux and Engel (2002), Duarte and Stockman (2001)).  
Other researchers have turned to bounded rationality or behaviorally based departures 
from rationality to generate the apparently volatile expectations of exchange rates.  For example, 
Frankel (1996) argues that exchange rates are detached from fundamentals by swings in 
expectations about future values of the exchange rate.  Four pieces of evidence suggest that 
overly volatile expectations are to blame for such behavior: 1) Survey measures of exchange rate 
expectations are very poor forecasts and are often not internally consistent (Frankel and Froot, 
  11987, Sarno and Taylor 2001);  2)  the failure of uncovered interest parity (UIP) seems to hinge 
on irrational expectations (Engel, 1996);  3)  Trend-following trading rules make risk-adjusted 
excess returns (Neely, 1997; Neely, Weller, and Dittmar, 1997);  4)  Switching from a fixed to a 
floating exchange rate changes the volatility of real exchange rates and the ability of UIP to 
explain exchange rate changes (Mussa, 1986).  
The volatile expectations of an apparently economically significant group of agents have 
created misalignments—predictable long-term returns—that are potentially exploitable.   
Monetary authorities have invested in foreign exchange in anticipation of such long-run 
reversion to fundamentals.  Neely (2005) summarizes evidence that major central banks, those of 
the United States, Germany, Japan, Switzerland and Australia, have made excess returns–returns 
on a zero investment strategy–on their foreign exchange intervention by “buying-low and 
selling-high” (Leahy (1995), Neely (1998), Sweeney (1997), Sjöö and Sweeney (2001)).  These 
predictable long-term returns are associated with deviations from PPP fundamentals.  
There are doubtless private agents with realistic expectations who similarly profit from 
fundamental-based investments.  But these agents—coupled with central banks—do not seem to 
have enough market power to prevent persistent and large departures from fundamentals.  Why 
is there not more private risk arbitrage? 
A growing literature argues that various limits to arbitrage reduce the speed with which 
rational speculators can push rates back to fundamentals.  Noise trading in the presence of 
fundamental risk makes arbitrage risky (De Long et al., 1990).  Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
(hereafter SV) explored how traders are constrained by risk and principal-agent problems.  In 
particular, SV argue that arbitrage is limited in asset markets because the marginal investor in 
asset markets is a highly specialized agent who loses resources precisely when asset prices 
  2diverge far from fundamental values.  Specifically, the SV argument depends on the existence of 
performance-based arbitrage (PBA).  PBA means that the capital available to arbitrageurs 
depends on the recent returns to their portfolios.  When foreign exchange rates diverge further 
from fundamentals, fundamental-based traders (FBTs) lose money.  As the divergence worsens, 
so does the performance of FBTs, both directly because of their losses and because principals 
provide less capital.  The loss of capital means that risk-arbitrage investment in anticipation of a 
return to fundamentals fails precisely as divergence from fundamentals worsens, leading to 
greater divergence.   
Thus, although risky arbitrage will certainly exert a force in the long run to correct 
deviations from fundamentals, this force is attenuated in the short run. The weakness of risky 
arbitrage will lead to potentially significant misallocation of resources as trade and investment 
decisions are made on the basis of distorted price signals. 
The limits-to-arbitrage argument is especially relevant for foreign exchange, where there 
is a great deal of uncertainty about fundamentals and very long horizons for mean reversion.  
While such uncertainty surely exacerbates the PBA that stems from principal-agent problems, 
monetary authorities are likely to be less affected by the forces that drive PBA.  Central banks 
have proved that they are willing to take long-term positions on reversion to fundamentals and 
they have a vested interest in reducing misalignments with sterilized intervention.
1  
This paper seeks to answer the following:  How does the presence of capital dedicated to 
risk arbitrage influence the intervention strategy of a central bank facing fundamental 
uncertainty?  To this end, we extend the SV model to include a central bank and fundamental 
uncertainty in addition to rational arbitrageurs. 
                                                           
1 Krugman and Miller (1993) make a related argument in showing how central bank intervention can stabilize 
exchange rates if speculators are subject to rules that require them to limit their maximum “drawdown”. 
  3Much of the theoretical debate about the impact of intervention has focused on 
informational issues. Our analysis complements the existing literature by looking at the strategic 
interaction between arbitrageurs and the central bank in an environment in which the bank has a 
longer time horizon and is not subject to the same short-term pressures that limit the actions of 
professional arbitrageurs.  
We examine optimal intervention policy in a model which extends that of SV by 
introducing a central bank who plays the role of a Stackelberg leader in an intervention game. 
The bank’s objective function values both trading profitability and stabilization of the exchange 
rate around its fundamental value. We are particularly interested in characteristics of intervention 
strategy in the situation where the effects of arbitrage are weakened. The presence of arbitrageurs 
in the market makes a difference to the optimal intervention policy. If the central bank intervenes 
aggressively during periods of moderate misalignment, but when there is a possibility that the 
misalignment will get worse, it risks weakening the synergistic effect of risk arbitrage. This 
happens because the intervention increases the short run losses of arbitrageurs and reduces the 
funds they have available to bear against misalignment in the future. Using the same logic, we 
identify a “high-powered” intervention effect when deviations from fundamentals are unusually 
large. We show that the combination of these two effects has a substantial impact on the dynamic 
intervention strategy of the central bank. 
2.  The Limits to Arbitrage Literature 
The limits-to-arbitrage concept has significantly influenced thinking on asset pricing.   
Indeed, Barberis and Thaler (2002) define limits to arbitrage as one of the building blocks of 
behavioral finance. 
  4While SV made a generic argument about the limits to arbitrage in general asset markets 
others have used the concept to explain or rationalize behavior in specific contexts.  Collins, 
Gong and Hribar (2003) argue that limits to arbitrage prevent institutional investors from 
exploiting the apparently abnormal returns enjoyed by firms with low institutional ownership.   
Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) find that rational investors (hedge funds) captured much of the 
upswing in technology stocks but were able to reduce their exposure before the crash.  They 
argue that limits to arbitrage might contribute to the preference for rational investors to ride 
bubbles and destabilize prices.  Brav, Heaton and Rosenberg (2004) criticize both rational and 
behavioral finance for a lack of testable predictions.  But they argue that ex post explanations 
support the limits of arbitrage arguments on which behavioral finance relies.  Gabaix, 
Krishnamurthy, and Vigneron (2005) examine the mortgage-backed securities (MBS) market 
through the lens of limits to arbitrage theory.  They find that the pricing of homeowner 
prepayment risk is consistent with the specialized arbitrageur hypothesis.  Massa, Peyer, and 
Tong (2005) examine the equity performance and investment in the 2 years after a firm is added 
to an index.  They find behavior that supports a limits to arbitrage theory.  McMillan (2005) 
compares nonlinear dynamics in asset returns from European to Asian markets, concluding that 
limits to arbitrage are greater in Asian markets.   Stein (2005) uses the limits-to-arbitrage concept 
to explain the existence of open-end funds and the coexistence of large mispricings with rational, 
competitive arbitrageurs.  Greenwood (2005) develops testable predictions from a limits-to-
arbitrage framework with multiple risky assets; Nikkei 225 data support these predictions. Jiang, 
Lee, and Zhang (2005) examine the relationship between uncertainty in estimates of firm value 
and equilibrium returns.  Their findings are consistent with models that incorporate limits to 
rational arbitrage.
  5Not all papers find support for limits-to-arbitrage models.  Gallagher and Taylor (2001), 
for example, evaluate a risky arbitrage hypothesis versus a limits-to-arbitrage hypothesis in U.S. 
equity markets.  They find that the speed of mean reversion favors the risky arbitrage hypothesis.  
3.  The Model  
We extend the model developed by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) in the following ways. 
We apply the model specifically to the foreign exchange market, introduce a central bank in 
addition to arbitrageurs and also permit uncertainty about fundamentals. For concreteness we 
assume that the problem involves U.S. based arbitrageurs, noise traders, a foreign central bank, 
and that the foreign currency is the euro. There are three time periods. The expected fundamental 
value of the euro (the exchange rate measured as the dollar price of the euro) at time t is   . It 
becomes known either at time 2 or at time 3. It can take on two values,   and   with equal 
probability. Its expected value is 
t V
H V L V
V  The exchange rate at time t, t =1, 2 is  t p . In each of the first 
two periods noise traders experience a pessimism shock. At time 1, the first period shock  1 S    
known to arbitrageurs and to the central bank, but the second period shock,   is not. The 
shocks affect noise trader demand for the euro at time t,  .  (Note that the cumulative second 
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At time 2 the exchange rate either returns to fundamental value and all uncertainty is resolved or 
there is a further pessimism shock which occurs with probability q.  Thus,  V V = 1  and 
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  6Each period risk neutral arbitrageurs have a maximum amount of dollars   that they can 
invest.   is assumed to be given and   is determined endogenously, through performance in 
the first period. If the exchange rate does not return to fundamental value in period 2, 
arbitrageurs want to invest all their resources in the euro since 
t F
1 F 2 F
V p < 2  in equilibrium. So total 
cumulative demand for the euro by arbitrageurs in this case is  2 2 p F . The central bank may 
intervene at time 1 or time 2.  Intervention at time t is denoted  . Assuming unit supply of the 
euro, the exchange rate at times  is given by: 
t I
2 , 1 = t
1 1 1 1 1 I D S V p + + − =         ( 2 )  
2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 I I D D S S V p + + + + − − = , 
where   is incremental arbitrageur demand in period i, measured in dollars.  Again, note that I i D 2 
is the incremental intervention in period 2.  We allow intervention at time 2 to depend on the 
state, so the level of intervention will depend on the realization of the noise shock. In period 1 
arbitrageurs may choose not to invest all their resources in the euro, but rather to hold some 
funds back in case the currency becomes even more undervalued in the future. Thus  1 1 F D ≤ . 
The model captures two sources of uncertainty in a simple way: First, there is uncertainty 
about the speed with which the exchange rate will revert to fundamental value. It may take either 
two or three periods. Second, there is uncertainty about what the true fundamental value is. 
  We examine first the decisions of arbitrageurs. We assume that they maximize their 
expected terminal wealth, which is equivalent to maximizing the expected dollar value of the 
currency portfolio under suitable conditions. Performance-based arbitrage dictates that the 
supply of funds at time 2 depends on results from period 1. Investors place funds with 
arbitrageurs, but lack a detailed understanding of the strategy followed by the arbitrageurs. They 
  7evaluate the skill of the arbitrageur simply by observing results. Profitable portfolio managers 
attract additional funds while loss-making managers experience an outflow of funds. This 
outflow comes about as a consequence of the fact that some investors infer that the loss-making 
managers are of lower ability than they had previously thought.  
We follow SV in assuming a linear specification for the function relating gross return and 
fund inflows or outflows. The expression for such incremental fund flows in period 2 is given by 
the sum of the performance based measure and the funds that were not invested at all in period 1 
(F1 – D1).  
   ( ) 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 D F p p aD D − + − − =   .     (3)  1 ≥ a
If   then the arbitrageurs’ gains and losses simply reflect changes in portfolio value. But if 
 then there is a multiplicative effect of dollar gains and losses. A given dollar loss causes 
investors to withdraw funds and conversely a dollar gain generates a cash inflow. Incremental 
demand from arbitrageurs at time 2 is then composed of any funds not invested at time 1, 
, together with the fund flows described in (3). So the arbitrageurs’ total dollar demand 
for the euro at time 2 is: 
1 = a
1 > a
1 1 D F −
   ( ) ( ) 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 p p aD F p p aD D F D D D F − − = − − − + = + = .   (4) 
This specification is unaffected by the presence of the central bank because it describes the 
allocation of capital based on performance, although in equilibrium exchange rates and so 
arbitrageur resources will be affected by intervention. 
 If  , the exchange rate returns to its fundamental value, arbitrageurs close out 
their positions and at time 1 their expected wealth 
1 2 S S − =
[ ] W E  is 
   [ ] ( ) 1 1 1 1 p V aD F W E − − = .       ( 5 )  
If  , then  0 2 > = S S []() V p F W E 2 2 =  or (using the expression in (4) for F2) 
  8[]() ( ) ( ) 1 2 1 1 2 1 p p aD F p − − .         V W E =   ( 6 )  
Since we h t the probability that  1 2 S S − = ave assumed tha  is  q − 1 , the arbitrageur’s problem in 
period 1 is: 
  () () () ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 max
1 D p p aD F p V q p V aD F q − − + − − −  subject to 
nd the first order condition is given by: 
1 1 F D ≤  
a
  () () ( ) 0 2 1 ≥ − p p ,        ( 7 )  
where the in  holds with complementa




1 1 1 + − − V q p V q
equality  ry slackness.  1 1 F D ≤
Next we cons  objective of the central bank.  We assu
hange rate subject to an expected (shadow) loss constraint. The bank is itself uncertain 
about the true fundamental value of the currency but is aware of the possible impact of noise 
traders and arbitrageurs. Like the arbitrageurs, it observes the noise shock  1 S  but does not know 
whether in period 2 the exchange rate will be driven further from its expected fundamental value 
by a deepening surge of pessimism. In addition it does not know whether the true fundamental 
value revealed in periods 2 or 3 will be  H V  or  L V . 
In contrast to another strand of the literature on intervention which focuses on the effec
ting a value for the exchange rate different from fundamental value, we suppose that the 
bank’s objective is to bring about full allocative efficiency. In other words, its target for the 
exchange rate corresponds to its best estimate of true fundamental value. However, we introduce 
a cost of intervention that is related to uncertainty about fundamentals and the possible losses the 
bank may incur. Since the shadow cost of foreign exchange is V  the expected cost of 
intervention is 
  () ( ) () ( ) 2 1 5 . 0 5 . 0 qI I V V V V L H + − + − ,       ( 8 )    
  9which is zero. The probability q multiplying the level of intervention in period 2 reflects the fact 
that intervention is state contingent. In the event that the noise shock deepens, the level of 
intervention is  2 I . If on the other hand the shock disappears (with probability (1 – q), there is no 
intervention. Thus a risk neutral central bank facing no other costs of intervention would choose 
perfect stabilization at expected fundamental value. Since there is good reason to believe that 
banks worry about losses on intervention, we capture this by assuming that the bank attaches a 
higher weight to losses (πL) than to gains (πH).  The expected cost of intervention is as follows: 
   () ( )( ) 5 . 0 1          2 1 < − = + − + − L H L L H H qI I V V V V π π π π .    (9) 
One 0 ≥ − H L π π as an index of the risk aversion of the central bank. It is a measure   can interpret 
of the degree to which losses are given greater weight than gains. Introducing the notation 
0 > − = − ≡ ∆ L H V V V V V ,the central bank then faces the optimization problem: 




1 π π   ,     [ V




  (10) 
wh tes the relative weight that the central bank places on profitability ve ere   0 > k  deno rsus 
stabilization  The first term in the objective function represents the expected benefit from 
stabilization. Since  1 p  is not a random variable, although it will depend on the level of 
intervention at time 1, it occurs without a probability weight. The value of  2 p  is to be interpreted 
as that which occurs conditional on  0 2 >
.
= S S , i.e. pessimism increases. In the event that the 
exchange rate returns to fundamental  e 2, at time 1 its expectation is  value at tim V  and the term 
disappears from the objective function. So although the central bank does not know what value 
2 p  will take at the time that it formulates its optimal intervention strategy, it can compute its 
ue conditional on an additional noise shock as a function of the level of intervention at time 2.  val
This allows it to formulate an optimal state-contingent intervention strategy. 
  10  The second term in the objective function captures the cost of intervention. It depends 
both on the central bank’s subjective attitude to losses as measured by  L H π π −  and on its 
objective uncertainty about fundamentals, measured by  V ∆ . An alternative approach to 
modeling the costs of intervention would be to use realized rather than shadow profits and losses. 
However, in the present framework this has the rather unapp ing implication that the central 
bank—even if it were risk neutral—would refrain from perfect stabilization at expected 
fundamental value in order to generate an expected profit from the market. In other words it 
would choose to exploit its market power to destabilize the market to generate profits. 
 
4.  Equilibrium and Comparative Statics 
eal
We analyze an equilibrium in which arbitrageurs are price takers and the central bank 
rategy that takes into account the impact of its 
terve
 
follows an optimal dynamic intervention st
in ntion on the trading activity of arbitrageurs. We first present two special cases that are 
helpful in developing an intuitive understanding of the solution to the model. We assume that 
arbitrageurs have invested up to the limit of the funds available, i.e.  1 1 F D = , a situation termed 
“extreme circumstances” by Shleifer and Vishny.  
In the first case we look at the marginal effect of intervention   1 on the exchange 
rate at time 2, holding intervention at time 2 fixed. 
at time
Then we can show that: 





2 < − =
p aF dp
,       (11) 
− aF p p dI
given the stability condition  .
2 So increased intervention at time 1 actually worsens 
things—i.e., causes prices to deviate further from fundamentals—at time 2. The reason is that 
reducing the deviation of exchange rate from fundamental at time 1 increases the arbitrageurs’ 
                                                          
  1 1 aF p >
 
2 If this condition does not hold then arbitrageurs are better off not trading. See Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 46). 
  11losses at time 2. The resulting fund outflows mean that the arbitrageurs are less able to correct 
the second period shock. We call this situation destabilizing intervention. 
In the second case we consider the effects of intervention at time 2, conditional on a 
deepening of the noise shock, and holding intervention at time 1 fixed. Then we find that: 
   1
1 2 > =
p dp
,       
1 1 2 − aF p dI
  ( 1 2 )  
We get a “multiplier” effect on the exchange rate since there is both the direct effect and an 
indirect effect coming from the fact that now arbitrageurs lose less in the second period. We call 
this situati d intervention. 
riven from its fundamental value. These observations 
t arbitrageurs are fully invested at
on high-powere
  These effects illustrate the fact that there is an important interplay between the strategy of 
the central bank and the trades of the arbitrageurs. At the margin, intervention is more effective 
the further the exchange rate has been d
lead us to pose the following question: If the central bank pursues an optimal dynamic 
intervention strategy, what is the effect on this strategy of an increase in the availability of 
arbitrage capital? This leads us to state the following: 
 
Proposition Let  1 I  be intervention at time 1, and   2 I  be intervention at time 2 conditional on a 
deepening of the noise shock ( 0 2 > = S S ). Assume tha   1 = t .  
hen optimal interventio an increase in arbitrage capital (at  ) as follows: 
 
n adjusts to  0 1 = F T








1 − < ⎟ ⎟ ⎜ ⎜
⎝
− − − = p V
p
q         
() ( ) () 0 2




− + ⎟ ⎟
⎞
⎜ ⎜




p p p V
a
dI
   2
1 1 1 ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ p p dF
.  (13) 
Proof: See Appendix 
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The interpretation of this result is consistent with the intuition developed in the two 
special cases (11) and (12). The effect of introducing a “small” amount
the central bank to reduce its intervention more than dollar for dollar in the first period, and to 
ion in the second period contingent on an increase in noise trader 
essimism. Thus the presence of arbitrage capital leads to a significant asymmetry in the optimal 
interve
wing parameter values: 
 of arbitrage capital leads 
increase its intervent
p
ntion strategy of the bank. It intervenes less aggressively than before when the deviation 
of the exchange rate from fundamental value is moderate, and more aggressively when the 
deviation is extreme. The explanation lies in the effect that the presence of performance-based 
arbitrage has on efficient pricing. Larger noise shocks force arbitrageurs to partially liquidate 
their positions. Their ability to bear against mispricing is reduced precisely when the mispricing 
is most extreme. This comes about because arbitrageurs report interim losses which cause 
investors to withdraw funds. Central bank intervention in period 1 can actually increase period 2 
losses by keeping the period 1 exchange rate relatively close to fundamentals, leading to greater 
changes in the exchange rate from period 1 to period 2, which result in larger losses for the 
arbitrageurs. The central bank finds it advantageous to reduce these losses by scaling back 
intervention in period 1, thus increasing the amount of arbitrage capital available to stabilize the 
exchange rate in period 2.  
 
5. Numerical  Results 
  Next we show that this qualitative property of equilibrium, which we have shown to hold 
when the quantity of arbitrage capital is “small”, is more generally true. We present a numerical 
example using the follo , 1 = V   , 3 . 0 1 = S   , 1 . 0 2 = S   , 2 . 0 = q  
  13, 2 . 0 = − H L π π   , 25 . 0 = ∆V   = k 1 . 0 . Arbitrageurs always choose to be fully invested at  1 = t  
with these parameter values. In Figure 1 we fix a = 1.2, the parameter that governs the rate at 
which funds are withdrawn when arbitrageurs make losses. For small values of  1 F  the central 
bank intervenes more aggressively in period 1 than i o t   
pite the fact that the incremental noise shock in period 2 is 
considerably smaller than that in period 1.  
In Figure 2 we fix  2 . 0 1 = F  and allow a to vary. Increasing a shifts inte ention from 
period 1 to period 2, as our earlier discussion would lead us to expect. That is, as PBA becomes 
more important, the central bank intervenes less aggressively in period 1 – to reduce period 2 
losses to arbitrageurs – and more aggressiv
n peri d 2.  Bu as   increases the
verses, des
ely in period 2. Note that the level of intervention in 




contingent on an increase in the pessimism of noise traders. If 
the exchange rate reverts to fundamental value at time 2 as a result of the early dissipation of 
market pessimism, the central bank is able to close out its intervention position, so that  1 2 I I − = .  
This tendency of the central bank to intervene less when the importance of PBA increases 
(a rises) explains why it is not optimal for the central bank to simply fully offset the noise shock 
in the first period.  As explained in the previous section, intervention in period 1 will increase 
period 2 losses by keeping the period 1 exchange rate relatively close to fundamentals, leading to 
greater changes in the exchange rate from period 1 to period 2, which result in larger losses for 
the arbitrageurs. 
Figure 3 illustrates the effect of simultaneous variation in  1 F  and a. Not surprisingly we 
see that the effect of varying a becomes more pronounced as  1 F  increases.  That is, larger 
resources for arbitrageurs magnify the PBA effect on intervention. 
  14   th
n, so we would predict that 
Our results provide a potential explanation for the fact that e frequency of intervention 
has tended to decline over time, but the magnitude of interventions has increased.
3 As the 
quantity of arbitrage capital devoted to currency trading has rise
intervention when exchange rates deviate only to a moderate degree from fundamentals would 
decline, whereas periods of extreme divergence would attract an increased volume of 
intervention. 
    Finally, we can examine how the results would change if the central bank’s risk 
aversion ( H L π π − ) or the uncertainty about fundamentals ( V ∆ ) increases.  The value of k, the 
weight in the central bank’s optimization function graphs subsumes both variables: An increase 
mine ho
ave shown persistent 
mis While volatile expectations seem to be a plausible theory as 
to w
                                                          
in k is equivalent to an increase in risk aversion or an increase in fundamental uncertainty.  So, 
we can exa w intervention in both periods changes as  nction of k.  Figure 4 duplicates 
Figure 1, but for 3 different values of k, k = 0.1, 0.7, and 1.3.  As k increases, intervention in 
both periods tends to decline, but intervention in period 1 declines faster. At the same time, the 
sensitivity of intervention in period 2 to  1 F  increases with the value of k.   
6.  Discussion and Conclusion  
The behavior of the foreign exchange market has puzzled economists since the inception of 
floating exchange rates in 1973.  In particular, exchange rates appear to h
a fu
alignments with fundamentals.  
hy exchange rates should deviate from long-run fundamentals, it is less clear why there is 
not more risk-arbitrage on a return to long-term fundamentals.  Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
 
3 For example, the U.S. authorities intervened 281 times from January 1, 1986 to January 1, 1996, but only twice 
since January 1, 1996.  At the same time, the magnitude of a given intervention in the latter period was almost 5 
times larger than an intervention in the former period. Similarly, the German authorities did not intervene from 1995 
to the transition to the European Central Bank (ECB) in 1999. And the ECB has reportedly intervened sparingly 
since its inception.   
  15provide at least a partial answer by pointing out some problems associated with assuming that 
rational risk-arbitrage will quickly drive asset prices back to long-run equilibrium.  In particular, 
they show that “performance-based asset management” may generate situations in which asset 
price disequilibrium will worsen, before being corrected. This in turn limits the effect of rational 
risk-arbitrage.  
  This paper extends the Shleifer and Vishny (1997) model to include central bank 
intervention and fundamental uncertainty.  Our results indicate that increasing availability of 
arbitrage capital has a pronounced effect on the dynamic intervention strategy of the central 
ust 1998, 
bank. Intervention is reduced during periods of moderate misalignment and amplified at times of 
extreme misalignment. This pattern is consistent with empirical observation.  We show also that 
the central bank’s uncertainty about the true fundamental value of the exchange rate and its 
aversion to the risk of making losses are factors that will limit its intervention activity. 
  It is worth noting that the logic of our argument is not confined to the foreign exchange 
market. But it is certainly true that episodes in which monetary authorities have intervened to 
influence the stock market are much less common. One such occurrence was in Aug
when the Hong Kong Monetary Authority purchased HK$118 billion in shares in the 33 large 
capitalization stocks of the Hang-Seng Index over a period of ten days (Bhanot and 
Kadapakkam, 2004). This was a massive intervention, representing roughly twenty times the 
average daily trading volume on the Hong Kong market. To the extent that extreme deviations 
from fundamentals are less common in a stock market index than in the market for foreign 
exchange, and that more private capital is devoted to arbitrage in the stock market, our model 
provides a possible explanation for the difference in observed frequency of intervention, and for 
  16the fact that when such interventions do take place in the stock market, they are particularly 
large. 
  A primary longer-term goal of any research program that seeks to understand the 
intervention behavior of central banks will need to explain the diminishing appetite for such 
intervention.  The increasing importance of private sector risk-arbitrage, the diminishing ratio of 
intervention resources to trading volume, and greater reliance on verbal interventions may be 
important factors in modeling this trend.  
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  20Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 
We assume that parameters generate an equilibrium in which arbitrageurs are constrained in the 
first period, i.e.  . It is convenient to introduce the variable   to denote 
cumulative intervention at time 2. Prices in periods 1 and 2 are given by: 
1 1 F D = 2 1 I I IC + ≡
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The expression for   has incorporated the impact of performance-based arbitrage on demand at 
time 2 as captured in equation (3) in the paper. The central bank’s problem is: 
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We substitute in the expressions for   and   above and derive the first-order necessary 
conditions for an optimum by setting the partial derivatives with respect to   and   equal to 
zero. We write these conditions as implicit functions of the variables of interest. 
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C .      (A.4) 
If we denote the matrix of partial derivatives by J, then we find that: 
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.       (A.6) 
We obtain the results in the text by evaluating the partial derivatives on the right-hand-side of 
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Figure 1: Intervention as a function of the level of arbitrage capital, F1. 
 
Notes:  The solid line denotes intervention in period 1 (I1) and the dashed line is 
intervention in period 2 contingent on a further pessimistic shock (I2). 
 
  23Figure 2: Intervention as a function of a. 
 
 
Notes:  The solid line denotes intervention in period 1 (I1) and the dashed line is 
intervention in period 2 contingent on a further pessimistic shock (I2). 
  24 
Figure 3: Intervention as a function of  F1 and a. 
 
Notes:  The top (bottom) panel shows intervention in period 1 (2) as a function of F1 
and A.  
  25Figure 4: The effect of changing the central bank's risk aversion or uncertainty about 
fundamentals 
 
Notes:  The figure shows the effect of changing the central bank's risk aversion or uncertainty 
about fundamentals, which are both mediated through k.   
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